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Abstract
We analyze the e!ects of trade liberalization on "rms’ decisions and pro"ts in a vertical
product di!erentiation model with countries which have di!erent characteristics. Firms
decide product speci"cations at the beginning of the game, in which autarky is followed
by trade liberalization (whose date is anticipated). Our analysis suggests that a "rm
located in a large (or rich) country is the likely market leader at the trade equilibrium.
This outcome might be reversed if small country "rms have a strong cost advantage,
transport costs are negligible, or if the large country opens its market before the small
one. ( 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyzes oligopolistic competition between "rms located in two
countries having di!erent sizes. It aims at uncovering the e!ects of trade
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liberalization on product choice and pro"ts obtained by the "rms, and total
welfare of the countries involved.
We assume that "rms correctly anticipate the pace of trade liberalization and
take it into account when deciding their product speci"cations at the beginning
of the game. For a certain number of periods each country is in autarky. Then
trade liberalization occurs, and "rms compete in the international market for
the rest of the time the game is played. The intertemporal pro"ts of the "rms are
therefore a function of the time at which trade liberalization occurs. The longer
the delay with which countries decide to open their borders, the larger the
impact of the autarky conditions and therefore the more relevant the character-
istic of the domestic market. In such a setting, autarky and international trade
are special cases of a more general situation. This is a noteworthy feature of our
model, since most models of trade do not deal with intermediate situations
where "rms operate under autarky in some periods and under trade in others.
The crucial parameter here is the timing of trade liberalization. Although we
treat this parameter as exogenous and analyze the e!ects of changes in it, our
framework might be extended to analyze the case where the timing of trade
reform can be an endogenous variable.
To study endogenous product choices, we use a partial equilibrium model of
vertical product di!erentiation. We show that a "rm from a large (or rich)
country is likely to be the industry leader after trade liberalization. Indeed, the
equilibrium where the market leader is a "rm from a small (or poor) country
either does not exist (when asymmetries are strong), or if it exists it is risk-
dominated by the equilibrium where the market leader comes from the large (or
rich) country. In a version of the model with production cost asymmetries, the
small country will become the market leader if it has a strong production cost
advantage.
The opening of trade has two e!ects on the "rms’ pro"ts. On the one side,
there is a competition e!ect, since "rms face new foreign competitors. On the
other side, there is a market expansion e!ect, since with trade liberalization "rms
can sell in an additional market. In general the market leader, which is more
likely to be the "rm from the large country, tends to gain more from free trade.
The "rm from the small country might still bene"t from trade even if it is not the
market leader, because it can sell in a larger market than the domestic one. This
happens when the asymmetry in size between the countries is very pronounced.
For the same reason, when trade occurs with a small enough country, the large
country’s "rm will lose from trade even though it is the market leader at the
trade equilibrium (the competition e!ect dominates the size e!ect).
Our analysis helps to understand better the literature on gains from trade and
their distribution between unequal countries. Markusen (1981) shows that trade
does not necessarily increase income in both countries, if they di!er in size. In his
model "rms (one in each country) produce homogeneous goods and compete
a‘ la Cournot when trade opens. Under constant returns to scale the large
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1Large countries might lose from trade also in Cordella (1993) and Nguyen and Wigle (1992).
2This is an aspect which was also shown in a di!erent context by Motta (1992), where "rms from
the small country might have to exit the market because of the competition by higher quality
producers.
country would be an importer of the good and might lose relative to autarky.
The small country is therefore the most likely to bene"t from trade liberaliza-
tion. The situation can change under increasing returns to scale, since the large
country would have a cost advantage which might result in it being the exporter
and the bene"ciary of trade. With monopolistic competition, Krugman (1980)
shows that workers are better o! in the larger country, owing to the role played
by economies of scale. However, trade has a positive impact on both countries’
welfare, since consumers bene"t from larger number of product varieties.
In our model, similarly to Krugman (1980), welfare is highest in both coun-
tries when trade liberalization occurs immediately. Possible losses by "rms are
outweighed by consumers’ gains, which come under the form of lower prices and
higher average qualities. In a sense, however, we "nd again Markusen’s concern
that trade brings about unequal gains. Despite the overall increase in welfare for
both the large and the small country, our analysis underlines the possible
detrimental impact that trade can have on the pro"tability of the xrms located in
one of the countries. This is an issue which has received less attention in the
trade literature, even though it is crucial to understand under which conditions
"rms have an incentive to support trade processes.
A paper by Anderson et al. (1989) addresses this question in the context of an
oligopolistic industry with homogeneous goods. It is found there that at least in
one of the two countries "rms make higher pro"ts under autarky than under free
trade. In our model, unlike Anderson et al. (1989), it is not always the large
country "rms which lose from trade.1 Our "xed costs of quality improvements
imply that the "rm located in the bigger market has an advantage (comparable
to the cost advantage enjoyed in a model with increasing returns to scale) which
makes it the likely high-quality producer when markets open. A "rm in the small
country can then be relegated to low-quality products and lose from trade.2
In our model an immediate move towards free trade allows both countries to
improve their welfare with respect to autarky. However, our analysis also
suggests that trade liberalization reforms might receive strong opposition from
industrial groups, whenever "rms’ pro"tability is lower under trade.
This paper is also related to our previous work. Motta et al. (1997) presented
a similar model and found that domestic market demand plays an important
role in explaining which "rms are likely to be the leaders in international
markets, a result in line with both the trade literature (see Linder, 1961;
Krugman, 1980; Dinopoulos, 1988) and the business literature (see, for instance,
Porter, 1990). In that paper, however, "rms did not anticipate the occurrence of
3
3A crucial variable for this question is the relative market size of the countries. Since Motta et al.
(1997) assumed identical market sizes, the study of the e!ects of trade on "rms’ pro"ts would have
been uninteresting there.
4See Motta et al. (1997) for the case where "rms are already established when the game starts.
trade and could only adjust their quality choices after unforeseen trade liberal-
ization had been announced. Here, instead, we deal with perfectly rational
agents which fully anticipate the process of trade liberalization and take it into
account when making their product choices. Another important di!erence is
that our previous paper did not analyze how trade a!ects "rms’ pro"tability,
a question central to the present article.3 Further, in the present paper we study
the sensitivity of the results with respect to a number of variables we had not
considered in our previous paper. In particular, we analyze here the role played
by transportation costs, as well as di!erences in technologies and in production
costs between the two countries.
Cabrales et al. (2000) analyze a laboratory experiment on a game which is
similar to the one in this paper and "nd that the equilibrium which corresponds
to the case of the leader coming from the large country is selected much more
often by the experimental subjects than the alternative equilibrium. Therefore,
the laboratory results support the predictive power of risk dominance as
a criterion of equilibrium selection, as used in the present paper.
The paper is presented in the following way. In Section 2, we present the
general features of the game. This basic model is then studied within a simple
vertical product di!erentiation framework in Section 3. Some extensions
are considered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The basic model
Country A, which we call the large country, has a share k51
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of the total
population size S of the world. Country B’s share of the world population is
1!k. Apart from this size asymmetry, and unless otherwise speci"ed, these two
countries are perfectly identical.
At the beginning of the game, two "rms are considering entry into the
industry we want to analyze. One "rm is located in country A, and the other in
country B. The "rms are new in the industry and they have to decide the
speci"cation of their product. They then incur the cost of their investment in
product speci"cation and cannot change it any longer. Product choice is
therefore endogenous and irreversible.4
Firms anticipate future events correctly. In particular, they know that the two
countries have negotiated a trade liberalization agreement. For a number K of
years, from time 0 to time K!1, the two markets will operate under a regime of
4
5 Introducing a period of progressive adjustment to complete liberalization of trade would
complicate the analysis without adding any particular element of interest.
6„ can be either "nite or in"nite. By assuming the latter, though, we would have a supergame
which gives rise to many possible equilibria. Under "nite horizon, we avoid this problem.
7Pro"ts depend also on prices and quantities. Monopoly pro"ts do not depend on the other
country’s investment, while duopoly pro"ts depend on both countries’ investments.
autarky. Starting from period K, however, the two markets will be completely
integrated and they will remain in a such a situation until the end of the game,5
which occurs at time „!1.6
Firms have a common discount factor, d (we may think that capital markets
are open and therefore interest rates equalize), and the total present value of
pro"ts of "rm i is
<
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i
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where PM
i
represents the monopoly pro"t of "rm i (i.e. the per-period pro"t
when trade is not open) and PD
i
the duopoly pro"t.7 The variable which denotes
the investment in product speci"cation is x
i
. Note that in monopoly the pro"ts
of "rm i are independent of the product chosen by "rm j. G is a function which
attributes a cost to the investment made into the variety of the good. We assume
that "rms share the same technology and that no other "xed costs are necessary
to provide a market.
The above expression can be written as
<
i
"(1!dK)
(1!d) PMi #
(dK!dT)
(1!d) PDi !G (2)
or, equivalently,
(1!d)
(1!dT)<i"
(1!dK)
(1!dT)PMi #
(dK!dT)
(1!dT) PDi !
(1!d)
(1!dT)G. (3)
With an appropriate transformation of variables /"(1!dK)/(1!dT) we
obtain
n
i
"/PM
i
#(1!/)PD
i
!F, (4)
where F"[(1!d)/(1!dT)]G. Note that / tends to zero as K tends to zero. In
this case, trade liberalization is immediate and autarky pro"ts PM
i
do not play
any role in the "rm’s present value of pro"ts. At the other extreme, when / is
equal to one, K tends to „!1. Firms are in a situation of domestic monopoly
throughout their life.
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8See e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), and Motta (1993).
9This function is widely used in this type of models. See, e.g., Motta (1993). One may interpret the
parameter k as incorporating the scalar term (1!d)/(1!dT) in Eq. (3).
10 In the working paper version we show that the qualitative results are una!ected by the
assumption of quantity instead of price competition.
11One can check that the prices chosen at the last stage of the game by the "rms are independent
of the hypothesis of integrated vs. segmented markets, that is of whether "rms can price discriminate
or not across countries.
3. Endogenous quality choices: The model
We use a vertical product di!erentiation model8 to analyze more in depth the
game whose general features we have brie#y outlined above. In this section we
assume that there exist no transport costs and that technology, costs and
incomes (or tastes) are identical in the two countries. (We relax each of these
assumptions in the next section.) Countries di!er only by population sizes.
In the two countries consumers have utility function ;"hu!p, if they buy
one unit of the di!erentiated good, and ;"0, if they do not buy. The symbols
u and p denote quality and price of the good, while h represents a taste
parameter. The distribution of h in the two countries is the same. We assume it is
uniform and that h3[0,hM ]. The mass of consumers is given by hM S
i
in each
country i (i"A,B), with S
A
5S
B
(country A has a higher population size than
country B).
Firms decide on the quality they want to produce at the initial period
t"0. To do so, they incur a "xed cost F
i
"ku2
i
/2.9 Firms choose prices in each
period t.10 We can now solve for the last stage of the game. In the case of
monopoly, a "rm faces demand q
i
"S
i
hM !p
i
/u
i
, and its optimal price choice is
p
i
"u
i
hM /2. Correspondingly, the monopolist pro"t is PM
i
"u
i
S
i
hM 2/4. Note that
the higher the population size, the higher the marginal pro"tability of
the monopolist, which has a larger incentive to invest in quality. In the
case of duopoly, that is, when "rms compete in the international market,
demand faced by the top and bottom quality "rm, respectively, would be
q
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.
At the price equilibrium, pro"ts for the top and bottom quality are:11
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We are now able to write the intertemporal pro"t functions of the "rms:
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i, j"A,B, iOj.
Recall that in the equation above S
A
"kS and that S
B
"(1!k)S. We have
deliberately not speci"ed whether the high (low)-quality "rm is located in
country A or in country B. Indeed, there might exist two equilibria in pure
strategies. In the "rst one, it is the "rm located in the bigger country which
produces the top quality. In the second, the market leader is the "rm located in
the small country.
3.1. The market leader is located in the big country
If the top quality "rm comes from country A, the "rst-order conditions are:
ShM 2M[64u3
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Divide these two equations, rearrange and write u
1
"ru
2
with r’1 to obtain
ShM 2u
2
M[16r4(4k/!3/!1)#r3(16k/!44/#92)
!r2(36k/!36/#48)#r(11k/!31/#32)
#k/]/[4(4r!1)3]N"0. (9)
We have found the analytical solutions of this equation by using the program
Mathematica. There is only one real root rH"r(k,/) which satis"es the con-
straint r’1. By substituting rH into expression (8) and using u
1
"ru
2
we "nd
the two qualities (uH
1
, uH
2
). Note that the parameters S, hM 2, 1/k enter the expres-
sions in a multiplicative way and therefore do not a!ect the solutions. From now
on we normalize these values to S"1, hM "10, and k"1. This is without loss of
generality, as the same property holds for the equilibrium with the "rm from the
small country being the leader.
For the pair (uH
1
, uH
2
) to be an equilibrium, we also have to check that country
B "rm does not "nd it pro"table to &leapfrog’ the rival and provide a quality
higher than uH
1
. In other words, it must be checked that there exists no quality
u@
1
such that n
1
(u@
1
, u
2
"uH
1
)5nH
2
(uH
1
, uH
2
). Likewise, it must be checked that the
"rm from country A does not have an incentive to deviate by supplying a quality
which is lower than uH
2
. Indeed, it is possible to prove that these deviations
7
12Details are available from the authors upon request.
13We omit the analytical solutions because they are extremely long and little can be gained from
their inspection.
are not pro"table, and therefore conclude that the pair (uH
1
, uH
2
) is always an
equilibrium.12
By replacing the equilibrium qualities one can obtain the expressions
for equilibrium pro"ts, consumer surplus, domestic welfare and aggregate
welfare.13
Fig. 1 shows equilibrium qualities, pro"ts and welfares as functions of the
delay in trade liberalization, represented by the parameter /, which ranges from
0 (free trade from the "rst period) to 1 (autarky forever). Each curve is drawn for
a given value of the parameter k, which denotes the relative size of the large
market. If a change of / is represented by a movement along a given curve,
a change in k shifts the curve. The top panels illustrate the evolution of
equilibrium qualities. As for u
1
, the results are unambiguous. For any given
relative market size, earlier liberalization increases the value of the top quality.
Indeed, a lower value of / has two e!ects which have the same sign. Firstly,
trade increases the size of the market (market size e!ect) and thus the marginal
pro"tability of quality investment. Secondly, it also increases the period in
which the "rm is exposed to competition (competition e!ect). In turn, this
pushes the "rm to increase its product quality to di!erentiate it from the other
"rm. Both e!ects raise the incentives to provide a higher quality. For a given
date of trade liberalization, an increase in the relative size of country A (an
increase in parameter k) increases the marginal pro"tability of quality, and thus
the incentive to invest in quality improvement.
The behavior of the bottom quality, apparently less clear cut, can be under-
stood by taking into account that (for given size of the market) the need to
di!erentiate in order to relax price competition pushes the low-quality "rm to
decrease its quality level. The competition e!ect takes in this case an opposite
sign to the market size e!ect. The opening of trade tends to decrease the quality
produced by the former "rm. When country B is not too small (e.g. when k"0.5
or 0.7), the market size e!ect } which in principle would tend to increase
qualities by both "rms } is less important. Hence, liberalization decreases the
quality level of the "rm located in the small country. However, when country
B is very small (e.g. when it is only a tenth of the total population size, k"0.9),
the positive e!ect due to the expansion of the market which follows trade
liberalization is stronger than the competition e!ect, thus increasing u
2
as
/ decreases.
The interpretation of the equilibrium pro"t schedules for a given size but
di!erent liberalization dates goes along the same lines. The top quality "rm is
the one which reaps the bene"t from liberalization to a greater extent. However,
8
Fig. 1. Market leader in the large country. Equilibrium qualities, pro"ts and welfares. /" timing of
trade liberalization; /"0, immediate liberalization; /"1, autarky forever.
when country A is very large, the expansion of the market given by trade tends
to play a smaller role than the e!ect of competition. (In the limit, when the size of
the small country tends to zero, the "rm would have to compete with a rival on
a market of the same size as in autarky.) For any given timing of liberalization,
9
14However, if trade does not open immediately but after many periods of autarky a country’s
welfare might worsen with respect to the closed economy equilibrium. This occurs when two
countries are very similar and trade is open for few periods only. In this case the "rm which is going
to produce the lower quality at equilibrium has lower pro"ts than under monopoly, and trade is not
open long enough for consumers’ gains to o!set the "rm’s losses (in Fig. 1, the welfare schedule
=
B
for k"0.5 takes a U-shape).
15See the working paper version of this paper for more details.
an increase in the value of k increases market demand and therefore the
pro"tability of country A "rm, whose pro"t function shifts upwards. Obviously,
pro"t shifts downwards for the bottom quality "rm, since an increase in
k implies a decrease in domestic demand.
Consumers from both countries bene"t from earlier liberalization (lower /)
through an increased competition which tends to increase the availability of
varieties, to reduce prices for given qualities and to increase the level of the top
quality on the market. The positive e!ect on consumer utility tends to outweigh
the possible negative e!ect on "rm pro"ts. Immediate trade liberalization brings
about a higher welfare level than under autarky, and for both countries.14
However, there is at least one "rm that loses by liberalizing trade early, so one
could expect that this "rm will oppose liberalization, if no compensating
mechanism is implemented.
3.2. The market leader is located in the small country
If the top quality "rm is located in country B, the "rst-order conditions are
ShM 2M[64u3
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u
2
(1!k/)#u
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We can then write u
1
"zu
2
(with z51) and use the same procedure followed
to derive the equilibrium solutions in the previous section. We then "nd the
value zH"z(k, /) which satis"es the "rst-order conditions, and by substitution
the candidate solution (uHH
1
, uHH
2
). However, this is not always an equilibrium.
Unless the two countries have exactly the same size, it is always possible to "nd
a value of the parameter / large enough for the candidate equilibrium to break
down.15 The "rm located in the large country "nds it pro"table to produce
a quality u@
1
higher than the quality uHH
1
the rival would produce at the candidate
solution, as n@
1
(u@
1
, u
2
"uHH
1
)’nHH
2
(uHH
1
, uHH
2
). The smaller the size of country B,
the more di$cult it will be for its "rm to be the market leader (the lower the
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Fig. 2. Existence of equilibria (E
1
: leader from large country; E
2
: leader from small country). u"
timing of trade liberalization; u"0, immediate liberalization; u"1, autarky forever.
value of / which is necessary to sustain this equilibrium). In the case where
/"0 each "rm is selling on the single market from the very beginning, and thus
the reduced size of the domestic market does not limit the scope for the
investment. However, as the delay in trade integration increases (as / rises), each
"rm produces for longer periods for the domestic market. If the size of the latter
is small, the domestic "rm cannot support the burden of a very high cost in
quality, even if it anticipates that it can be the leader once trade is liberalized.
This makes it easier for the "rm located in the large country to &leapfrog’ the
rival and produce a quality which is higher.
Fig. 2 shows the equilibrium outcomes in the plane (/, k). The equilibrium
where the leader comes from the large country (denoted by E
1
) always exists,
whereas the equilibrium where the leader comes from the small country (de-
noted by E
2
) exists only if trade is liberalized soon enough or if the two countries
are not too di!erent in sizes, for the reasons we have given above.
For the values of the parameters such that the equilibrium E
2
exists, one can
then use the values of quality, u
1
and u
2
, which solve Eqs. (10) and (11) to derive
all the other equilibrium values. Fig. 3 illustrates the equilibrium solutions (the
dotted line indicates parameter values for which the equilibrium with the small
country "rm being the leader does not exist). As in the previous case, the results
can be understood by thinking in terms of the competition and the market size
e!ects. A complete discussion is probably super#uous. It may be worth empha-
sizing that when the "rm from the large country is to be the bottom quality "rm,
then its pro"ts are certainly going to shrink as the date of liberalization is
anticipated. Since it comes from the large country and it produces the low
11
Fig. 3. Market leader in the small country. Equilibrium qualities, pro"ts and welfares. /" timing
of trade liberalization; /"0, immediate liberalization; /"1, autarky forever.
quality at the open markets equilibrium, the competition e!ect is always domi-
nant (the additional market when trade opens is relatively unimportant with
respect to the e!ect played by the opening of competition). The opposite is true
for the small country "rm, which bene"ts both from the expansion of the market
and from being the leader.
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16Standard re"nements like perfectness, properness, or strategic stability do not select among
strict Nash equilibria. Also, in this game there are no symmetric equilibria and no equilibrium
Pareto dominates the other (taking in to account only the welfare of the players, the "rms; and not
the consumers).
Even in this case, welfare attains its maximum level in both countries when
trade liberalization occurs from the outset (/"0). However, similarly to the
previous equilibrium case, there might be a welfare loss in the case of a delay in
the liberalization process. In particular, this occurs for a large country whose
"rm is relegated to the production of a low quality (see the schedule =
A
when
k"0.5), and when trade is liberalized only at a late period (/ is close to 1). Here
again, consumers do not enjoy free trade of goods for a long enough period to
outweigh the "rm’s losses with respect to autarky.
By comparing the values under the two di!erent equilibrium con"gurations
(Figs. 1 and 3), it can be checked that the domestic welfare in each country is
higher when the national "rm is the market leader, which suggests that a govern-
ment would have an incentive to commit to help the domestic "rm to gain such
a position. Total welfare is higher when the market leader is located in the large
country. This is quite intuitive a result, since it is more e$cient to have an
equilibrium where the top quality "rm spreads its investment costs over a larger
domestic market. Although our analysis suggests a welfare improving role for
free trade, the reader should be aware that gains from trade do not necessarily
arise in any vertical product di!erentiation models. In the papers by Shaked and
Sutton (1984) and Motta (1992) a country’s welfare might decrease following
a trade liberalization process. This di!erent outcome deserves an explanation. In
those models, the possible adverse e!ect of trade mainly depends on the fact that
the so-called &"niteness property’ holds there. As market size increases, a larger
number of "rms cannot coexist in the industry. Hence, when trade opens (that is,
as the size of the market rises), some of the "rms formerly operating in autarky
have to exit the industry. Since some "rms disappear at the trade equilibrium,
free trade can have a dramatic impact as the loss in "rms’ revenues can outweigh
consumers’ gains. In our model instead, the "niteness property does not hold
and trade liberalization has a less dramatic impact on "rms’ pro"ts, and hence
on countries’ welfare.
3.3. Risk dominance
It has been shown in Fig. 2 that the game has two strict Nash equilibria, for
a region of the parameters / and k. One of the few solution concepts that selects
between equilibria in our game,16 is the criterion of risk dominance introduced
by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Since the concept of risk dominance is de"ned
only for games with "nitely many pure strategies we have to discretize the
13
17The restriction does not condition the results, anyway. We have done numerical analysis
(available upon request), using the &tracing procedure’ of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), that shows that
the risk dominant equilibrium is the same even for a much "ner discretization.
18Details available from the authors.
strategy space. We will show the results obtained when the discretization is very
coarse, keeping only the equilibrium strategies for the two players.17
Risk dominance selects equilibria by comparing the &riskiness’ of equilibrium
points. This criterion compares the product of equilibrium misforecasts and the
equilibrium with the largest product is the one that risk dominates. Let a 2]2
game with the following payo! matrix:
B
1
B
2
A
1
a
11
, b
11
a
12
, b
12
A
2
a
21
, b
21
a
22
, b
22
where the payo!s are such that E
1
"(A
1
,B
1
) and E
2
"(A
2
, B
2
) are strict Nash
equilibria, and let ‚A
1
"a
11
!a
21
. ‚A
1
is the gain made by player A by
predicting rightly that the other player will play E
1
(and best responding to
the prediction) instead of predicting wrongly that the other player will play E
2
(and best responding to the prediction). Similarly, let ‚B
1
"b
11
!b
12
.
‚A
2
"a
22
!a
12
. ‚B
2
"b
22
!b
21
. We say that equilibrium E
1
risk dominates
equilibrium E
2
when ‚A
1
‚B
1
’‚A
2
‚B
2
.
Let E
1
be the equilibrium where the big country "rm is the leader and E
2
be
the equilibrium where the small country "rm is the leader. Recall that A is
the big country and B is the small country. In our case a
11
"n
1A
(uH
1
, uH
2
),
a
21
"n
1A
(uHH
1
, uH
2
), a
12
"n
1A
(uH
1
, uHH
2
), a
22
"n
2A
(uHH
2
, uHH
1
), b
11
"n
2B
(uH
1
, uH
2
),
b
21
"n
2B
(uHH
1
, uH
2
), b
12
"n
2B
(uH
1
, uHH
2
) and b
22
"n
1B
(uHH
2
, uHH
1
).
It can be shown numerically that ‚A
1
‚B
1
5‚A
2
‚B
2
,18 and the equality
only holds when /"0, that is, when liberalization occurs at the earliest possible
date. Thus, for the game we are studying, the risk dominance criterion selects the
equilibrium where the leader is the large country "rm, except in the limiting
case where the two countries liberalize the markets immediately (when /"0).
4. Transport costs, and other extensions
In this section, we relax some of the assumptions we have made so far. We
deal with positive transport costs, di!erences in tastes across the two countries,
di!erent costs and di!erent liberalization dates.
14
19 In other words, the locus which separates the regions (E
1
) and (E
1
,E
2
) in Fig. 2 would shift to
the left. See Appendix A.1 for the formal analysis.
4.1. Transport costs
Transport costs give a further advantage to the large country "rm, which
enjoys a larger captive market. Relative to the benchmark case, the existence of
transportation costs reduces the pro"tability of the small country "rm, and this
limits its incentive to invest in quality. It will be more di$cult for this "rm to be
the leader at equilibrium. With transport costs the area where the small country
"rm can be the leader at equilibrium (E
2
) is reduced with respect to the case of
no transport costs.19
Note also that while in the benchmark case (zero transport costs) the equilib-
rium with the "rm from the small country being the leader will always exist if
trade liberalization is immediate (/"0), this is no longer true in the case of
transport costs. This is because the large country "rm will enjoy the advantage
of a larger domestic market even if trade occurs from the "rst period. For large
enough transport costs and large enough country di!erences, equilibrium
E
2
does not exist even if trade occurs at the very beginning of the game.
4.2. Diwerent preferences for quality, or incomes
We have so far assumed that consumers in the two countries have identical
average propensity to pay (or taste) for quality (hM
A
"hM
B
"hM ). Since in our model
a relationship can be established between taste for quality and income (see
Tirole, 1988, p. 86), we may interpret the case treated so far as one where
countries have similar per-capita income but di!erent population size. If
trade occurs between countries of similar population size but di!erent per-
capita incomes, that is hM
A
5hM
B
and S
A
"S
B
, it is straightforward to see from the
pro"t expressions that results would not change, since country A "rm still enjoys
a larger domestic market. This explains why in the paper we refer to country
A indi!erently as the rich or the large country.
When S
A
5S
B
but hM
A
4hM
B
two forces of opposite sign are at work. The
former enlarges the relative size of market A, whereas the latter reduces it. In
particular, country A will have the larger domestic market if S
A
hM 2
A
5S
B
hM 2
B
. If
this condition holds, we can still speak of country A’s "rm as the one located in
the large country, and all the results and discussions above will still hold.
4.3. Asymmetries in costs
Consider "rst asymmetry in production costs. If the large country has also
a production cost advantage (for instance, because of cheaper labor), this
15
Fig. 4. Existence of equilibria, under productive cost advantage of country B (e
A
"0.7; e
B
"1). u"
timing of trade liberalization; u"0, immediate liberalization; u"1, autarky forever.
strengthens the previous results. Since both asymmetries increase its pro"tabil-
ity and incentive to invest in quality, country A "rm’s chances to be the market
leader at equilibrium are higher. The case where the small country "rm has
a production cost advantage is less trivial. The market scale e!ect helps the large
country "rm, whereas the production cost e!ect favors the small country "rm. It
can be shown (see the appendix for a formal argument) that if the cost advantage
is high enough, there is a unique equilibrium where the small country "rm is the
leader.
Fig. 4 represents this e!ect in the same space (/, k) as Fig. 2. Lower produc-
tion costs in country A (e
A
"0.7) relative to country B (e
B
"1) implies that the
area where only the equilibrium with the large country "rm being the leader (E
1
)
exists shrinks relative to the case of identical production costs. There also exists
a region where this equilibrium disappears altogether (see Appendix A.2 for
a formalization).
Consider now the case of identical production costs but di!erent costs of
developing the quality of products. We have so far assumed that the parameter
k in the quality improvement function is identical for both "rms (k
A
"k
B
"k). If
di!erences in R&D or advertising technologies were in favor of country A, these
would reinforce the country size advantage, and the results would be
strengthened. The interesting case is therefore the one where the "rm from the
small country B is more e$cient in introducing innovations and improving
quality, so that k
A
5k
B
. This case is very similar to the one just discussed where
"rms have identical quality costs but di!erent production costs (see Appendix
A.2). If the "rm coming from the small country has an advantage in quality
16
development costs, this might outweigh its market size disadvantage. The
stronger its cost advantage, the earlier trade liberalization and the less unequal
country sizes, the more likely it is that country B’s "rm will be the leader at the
equilibrium.
4.4. Diwerent dates of market opening
Although optimistic as for the welfare e!ects on each country as a whole, our
model also shows that trade liberalization might relegate a "rm coming from
poorer, smaller or less technologically advanced countries to production of
lower quality products. To compensate for existing asymmetries, di!erent
opening periods for the di!erent markets might be chosen. For instance, if
market A opens to imports from country B at a period K
A
: while (the smaller)
market B opens to trade at a later period K
B
’K
A
, the two "rms’ pro"ts
are n
A
"/
A
PM
A
#(1!/
A
)PD
A
!F, and n
B
"/
A
PM
B
#(/
B
!/
A
)PM
B
#
(1!/
A
)PD
B
!F, where /
A
and /
B
indicate when trade is liberalized in each
country.
The longer /
B
with respect to /
A
, the stronger the possibility for the small
country "rm to become the leader, since its marginal pro"tability of an invest-
ment in quality rises. However, a delayed opening date for the small country
might not be recommendable in general. First, we know that "rms located in
a very small country might gain from trade even if they are relegated to
production of lower quality goods (see Fig. 1) because of the importance of the
market expansion e!ect. Therefore, there would be no reason to grant them
a longer period of protection on their domestic market. Second, from a broader
perspective than the one allowed by our formalization, we should consider the
possibility of adverse e!ects of longer protection of a country’s "rms. Third, the
large country government, or its "rms, might not accept di!erent opening dates
for the two economies.
5. Conclusions
Our model underlines that domestic market size plays an important role in
determining the success of "rms in the international markets. Indeed, both
the analysis of the existence of equilibrium outcomes and the use of risk
dominance as the criterion for equilibrium selection suggest that a "rm coming
from a large (or rich) country is the likelier market leader under free trade, unless
it su!ers from strong cost disadvantages (and transport costs are not large).
Even if each country as a whole gains from trade, trade might decrease "rms’
pro"ts. In our model (when "rms’ costs are identical), there is always one "rm
which loses from trade. If the large country "rm is the market leader at the trade
equilibrium and size asymmetries are not too strong, the loser is the "rm from
17
the small country. But when size asymmetries are very strong it is the large
country "rm which loses from trade, since the (negative) competition e!ect
dominates the (positive) market expansion e!ect (which would be of a second-
order magnitude for a "rm coming from a very large country but not for a "rm
coming from a very small country). If the small country "rm is the leader after
trade is opened, then it is the large country "rm which always loses from trade.
This is the result of having to sell a lower quality product and of a market
expansion e!ect which is not su$cient to outweigh the negative e!ect of
competition. The use of risk dominance as a criterion for equilibrium selection
suggests that the case where the leader comes from the small country is less
likely to arise in the basic model. However, a strong enough production cost
advantage would result in a (unique) equilibrium where the small country "rm
would be the leader at the international trade equilibrium. We consider the
analysis carried out here as a step towards a better identi"cation of the forces
which hurt (or bene"t) "rms under processes of trade liberalization. We feel this
is a necessary step to understand the conditions under which "rms oppose (or
favor) such processes.
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Appendix
A.1. Transport costs
We introduce transport costs, modeled as &iceberg costs’. When a "rm ships
abroad a number q of units of the good, only q/g (with g51) units arrive at
destination in the foreign market. Therefore, foreign sales give the exporting "rm
a unit revenue of p/g which is lower than the price p paid by foreign consumers.
18
20Note that even when transport costs are positive, equilibrium prices do not depend on the
assumption of segmented vs. integrated markets. This is because transport costs a!ect only market
sizes, which in turn do not a!ect "rst-order conditions at the price stage of the game.
Monopoly pro"ts for the "rms are obviously unchanged, while duopoly pro"ts
for the top and the bottom quality "rms with positive transport costs are
(for i, j"A,B; iOj; g51):20
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We can now solve the price stage of the game. Intertemporal pro"ts are
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,
i, j"A,B; iOj; g51. (A.2)
By comparing the expressions above with expressions (5) and (6), one can see
that transport costs reduce the relative pro"tability of the small country "rm.
Duopoly pro"ts are now multiplied by (S
A
#S
B
/g) for the "rm located in the
large country A, and by (S
B
#S
A
/g) for country B "rm, while both were
multiplied by (S
A
#S
B
) in expressions (5) and (6) with no transport costs. Given
that S
A
5S
B
and g51, it follows that (S
A
#S
B
/g)5(S
B
#S
A
/g).
A.2. Asymmetries in costs
Assume that the production of a given good requires some units of that same
good, with the same level of quality u
i
, as an input in the production process
(think of farmers using seeds or computer manufacturers using computers). The
more ine$cient is the "rm (the higher its production costs), the fewer the units of
the good which are obtained as a "nal output from any given number of initial
units of the good.
Let us write gross pro"ts of "rm i as P
i
"p
i
e
i
q
i
, where e
i
is the e$ciency
parameter, or an inverse measure of production costs (with 15e
i
50) and
where p
i
and q
i
are as usual the price and output of "rm i. The parameter e
i
acts
simply as a rescaling factor on both duopoly and monopoly pro"ts and we can
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21This occurs when / is close to 1 and countries are not so di!erent (k close to 0.5). To understand
why this happens, consider the extreme case where /"1!e and k"0.5. In this case, trade opens
only at the very last period of the game and equilibrium qualities under liberalization cannot di!er
much from autarky ones. But since under autarky we have u
A
"(e
A
/4)(S/2)hM 2(u
B
"(1/4)(S/2)hM 2,
the former cannot be the top quality at the trade equilibrium. By a continuity argument, one can
then explain why in a region where / is close to 1 and k is close to 0.5 the E
1
equilibrium does not
exist.
write the intertemporal pro"t functions of the "rms in the presence of produc-
tion costs as
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,
i, j"A,B; iOj. (A.4)
Without loss of generality we "x e
B
"15e
A
. The e!ect of higher unit costs in
country A is to increase (decrease) the range of parameter values for which the
equilibrium with the small (large) country "rm being the leader exists. We can
have three possible situations, as discussed in Section 4.3. If size asymmetries are
large and cost asymmetries are small, we "nd only the equilibrium of type E
1
(leader in the large country); for low enough size and cost asymmetries both
equilibria exist; "nally, for low enough size asymmetries and large enough cost
asymmetries, only the type E
2
equilibrium (leader in the small country) exists.21
The case of di!erent costs of quality is formally identical to the case of
di!erent production costs. The reason is that the parameter k
i
enters multiplica-
tively the cost expression in the intertemporal pro"t function, while e
i
enters
multiplicatively the gross pro"t term in the same function (recall that
n
i
"e
i
PM
i
(u
i
)#e
i
PD
i
(u
i
, u
j
)!k
i
G(u
i
)). As a result, a higher k
i
a!ects equilib-
rium solutions in qualitatively the same way as a lower e
i
, all other things being
equal. Hence, the discussion made for the case of di!erent unit costs still holds
for the case of di!erent quality costs.
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